Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) is a main research issue in the domain of coalition games. A majority of existing works assume that the value of a coalition is independent of others in the coalition structure. Recently, there has been interest in a more realistic settings, where the value of a coalition is affected by the formation of other coalitions. This effect is known as externality. The focus of this paper is to make use of Maximum Satisfiability (MaxSAT) to solve the CSG problem where externalities may exist. In order to reduce the exponentially growing number of possible solutions in the CSG problem, we follow the previous works by representing the CSG problem as sets of rules in MC-nets (without externalities) and embedded MC-nets (with externalities). Specifically, enlightened by the previous MC-net-based algorithms exploiting the constraints among rule relations to solve the CSG problem, we encode such constraints into weighted partial MaxSAT (WPM) formulas. Experimental results demonstrate that an off-the-shelf MaxSAT solver achieves significant improvements compared to the previous algorithm for the same set of problem instances.
Introduction

Background
Coalition formation, the process by which agents come together and take joint actions to perform a set of tasks cooperatively, is an important capacity in multi-agent systems. Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) is one of the main challenges in coalition formation, involving partitioning a set of agents so that the total value of all coalitions is maximized.
A majority of the existing works assume that a coalition's value is independent of other coalitions in the coalition structure. Such settings are known as Characteristic Function Games (CFGs), where the value of a coalition is given by a characteristic function. Many, but clearly not all, real-world multi-agent problems happen to be CFGs [1] . Recently, there has been interest in a more realistic parti- tion function form of coalition values, where the value of a coalition is affected by the formation of other coalitions. This class of coalitional games is called Partition Function Games (PFGs). The effect is known as externality from coalition formation. Examples of games with externalities include collusion in oligopolies, congestion games, as well as various forms of international policy coordination between countries [2] , [3] . The space of possible solutions to the CSG problem is the same for both CFGs and PFGs, with O (n n ) for n agents. However, it should be noted that the input size is O (2 n ) for CFGs, while O (n n ) for PFGs [4] . Therefore, solving the CSG problem for PFGs is more challenging than the CFG case, which is already NP-complete [1] .
Related Works
There have been a number of attempts to solve the CSG problem for CFGs, broadly classified as Dynamic Programming and anytime optimal algorithms. Dynamic Programming (DP) based algorithms [5] , [6] break the optimization problem into sub-problems that can be solved recursively, and then combine the results of the sub-problems to output a final solution. These algorithms have the lowest worst complexity, i.e., given n agents, they guarantee to find an optimal solution in Θ (3 n ) time. However, they cannot generate a solution until they complete the entire execution. By contrast, anytime optimal algorithms, e.g., Integer Partition (IP) [7] , [8] , can return a solution even if they are terminated prematurely. The solution quality improves monotonically as the computation time increases. Nevertheless, these algorithms provide worst-case guarantees on the quality of the optimal solution in Θ (n n ), i.e., in the worst case, the algorithms need to search the entire space. In practice, IP has been shown to significantly outperform DP based algorithms for many popular test distributions of coalition values [9] . Recent algorithms [9] , [10] combine these two techniques, so as to overcome the limitations of DP and IP.
To date, few works have attempted to solve the CSG problem in PFGs. The initial work is under the restrictions that the externalities are either always positive or always negative [4] , [11] . These constraints were relaxed in [12] , which incorporates mixed externalities in the agent typesbased framework, i.e., positive and negative externalities could co-exist in a problem instance.
Another line of research focuses on solving the CSG Copyright c 2014 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers problem with concise representations [13] - [16] , where a characteristic function or a partition function is represented by a set of rules and the representation size can be reduced significantly. In this context, Ohta et al. [14] initially formalized the CSG problem as a problem of finding the subset of rules that maximizes the sum of rule values under certain constraints. Their work takes an initial step towards developing efficient constraint optimization algorithms for solving the CSG problem in CFGs, and shows that with concise representations such as MC-net [17] , the CSG problem could be solved within significantly less time than other works. In the case of PFGs, applying compact representation schemes to the CSG problem is more desirable, as PFGs require greater space than CFGs if we use the naive representation. In this context, embedded MC-net [18] , a compact representation designed for coalitional games with externalities, has been developed. By using the embedded MC-net, Ueda et al. [15] extend the formalization of CSG in [14] and develop a direct encoding algorithm to handle the externalities among the CSG problem.
Our Contribution
Over the last decade we have witnessed a dramatic speed-up of Boolean Satisfiability (SAT) solvers: problems with thousands of variables are now solved in milliseconds by stateof-the-art SAT solvers. Maximum Satisfiability (MaxSAT) is an optimization version of SAT. An interesting question is whether MaxSAT solvers can contribute as a constraint optimization tool to solving the CSG problem. In this paper, we try to answer the question by encoding the rule relationbased approach, i.e., direct encoding [14] , [15] , into propositional logic and show that our encodings accelerate solving the CSG problem significantly compared with the previous works. Specifically, problem instances for PFGs with 120 agents (rules) could be solved within 9 seconds on average, while the state-of-the-art algorithm, which does not make use of MaxSAT, requires on average 125 seconds to solve the same set of instances. This paper is organized as follows. Preliminaries are given in Sect. 2. Related work is given in Sect. 3, which is the foundation of Sect. 4. Section 4 introduces the rule relation-based WPM approach encoding the previous algorithm into weighted partial MaxSAT. The evaluation results are described in Sect. 5 and conclusion is given in Sect. 6.
Preliminary
Given a set of agents A, a coalition, denoted by C, is a nonempty subset of A, i.e., C ∈ 2 A \∅. A coalition structure, CS , is an exhaustive set of mutually disjoint coalitions over A, i.e., CS is subject to the constraints: ∀i,
We denote by Π (A) the set of all coalition structures over A.
Characteristic Function Game
In a setting without externalities, the value of a coalition C is given by a characteristic function v : 2 A → R, assigning a real-valued payoff to each coalition C ⊆ A. The value of a coalition structure CS is called social welfare, denoted as V (CS ), given by V (CS ) =
The objective of solving the CSG problem is to find an optimal coalition structure that makes the social welfare maximized, i.e., given A, find CS
Naive representation of characteristic functions enumerates the payoffs to each possible set of agents, requiring space exponential in the number of agents. Ieong and Shoham [17] develop a concise representation called marginal contribution network (MC-net), which largely reduces the space necessary for representation.
Definition 1: (MC-nets
). An MC-net consists of a set of rules R. Each rule r i ∈ R is expressed in a syntactic form I i → w i , where w i ∈ R and I i is the condition of rule r i , denoted by a conjunction of literals over A, i.e., Thus, the problem of finding CS * is equivalent to finding a set of rules that apply to some coalition C ∈ CS * , such that the sum of values in the set of rules is maximized.
Partition Function Game
In a setting with externalities, an embedded coalition is a pair (C, CS ). Let M denote the set of all embedded coalitions, i.e., M := {(C, CS ) : CS ∈ Π (A) , C ∈ CS }. The value of a coalition depends on the formation of other co-existing coalitions in the coalition structure, and is specified by a partition function, which is a mapping w : M → R. 
This is also the optimized social welfare, i.e., V (CS
Weighted Paritial MaxSAT
Boolean Satisfiability (SAT), the first problem shown to be NP-Complete [19] , is used to solve propositional Boolean formulas that only contain logic operations and, or and not. Typically, a propositional Boolean formula is expressed in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), which consists of a conjunction (logic and) of one or more clauses. A clause is a disjunction (logic or) of one or more literals, and a literal is an occurrence of a Boolean variable or its negation. In this paper, we identify a set of clauses with a conjunction of clauses.
Maximum satisfiability (MaxSAT) is an optimization version of SAT which is usually used as a tool for solving combinatorial optimization problems. Solving MaxSAT problem amounts to finding a variable assignment that maximizes the number of satisfied clauses in a CNF formula [20] . Weighted partial MaxSAT (WPM), as a variation of MaxSAT, distinguishes between hard and soft clauses. In WPM, each soft clause is associated with a positive numerical value. Solving WPM corresponds to finding an assignment that satisfies all the hard clauses and maximizes the sum of weights of satisfied soft clauses. Formally, we denote a WPM instance by the following formula: 
Revisiting Existing Works
In MC-nets or embedded MC-nets, each (embedded) rule is associated with a real-valued payoff. If the value is positive, we call the rule positive value (embedded) rule. If the value is negative, we call it negative value (embedded) rule. This section exhibits the existing works on handling positive and negative value (embedded) rules, respectively. Definition 3: [14] . (Feasible rule set). A set of rules is feasible if there exists CS where each rule applies to some coalition C or embedded coalition (C, CS ), where C ∈ CS .
Thereby, the problem of finding CS * is equivalent to finding a feasible rule set, such that the sum of values of the rule set is maximized.
To handle positive value rules in MC-nets, Ohta et al. [14] represent an MC-net in a rule relations-based graph. In this graph, each vertex is a rule, and between any two vertices, there exists an edge whose type is one of the four cases described as follows. [14] . (Relations between rules). The possible relations between rules r i and r j are classified into the following four non-overlapping and exhaustive cases:
Definition 4:
• Compatible on the same coalition: P i ∩ P j ∅ and
• Compatible on different coalitions:
The following constraints are proved to be sufficient to find out a feasible rule set among positive value rules in MCnets. We refer readers to [14] for the proof of the theorem. Theorem 1: [14] . A set of rules R is feasible if and only if R satisfies the following conditions.
R includes no pair of rules/vertices connected by an
"incompatible" edge, and 2. if two rules in R have the relation of "compatible on different coalitions", then they are not reachable via "compatible on the same coalition" edges in R .
To handle positive value embedded rules, Ueda et al. [15] develop an explicit form for each embedded rule er ∈ ER (i.e., er : I 0 |I 1 , · · · , I k → w er ) by adding each positive literal in I 0 to the negative literals of each I 1 , · · · , I k , as well as adding each positive literal in I 1 , · · · , I k to the negative literals of I 0 . Thus, er applies to some embedded coalition in CS if each of I 0 , · · · , I k applies to some coalition in CS. The explicit form relieves the algorithm of checking whether the coalitions I 0 and I i (i = 1, . . . , k) apply to are different.
When all (embedded) rules have positive values, the solver in [14] only needs to select as many rules as possible because satisfying more rules never decreases the social welfare. However, when negative values are involved, extra constraints are required to specify when negative value (embedded) rules should be selected, otherwise, the solver would simply ignore these rules because selecting them decreases the social welfare. This would lead to incorrect results since in some cases, choosing some negative value (embedded) rules is the precondition of satisfying more positive value (embedded) rules.
To handle negative value (embedded) rules, Ueda et al. [15] create zero-valued dummy rules for each negative value (embedded) rule, and specify their constraint in Theorem 2. Readers may refer to the proof in literature [15] . Theorem 2: [15] . A negative value (embedded) rule applies to a coalition in coalition structure CS if and only if none of its dummy rules apply to any coalition in CS .
Rule Relation-Based WPM
In this section, we set out to exploit rule relations and the technique of direct encoding to WPM. First, we consider a special case that a rule contains only one agent. In this case, the rule is always selected because no matter how a CS is structured, a rule with a single agent a always applies to a coalition that contains a. Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper, we assume each rule contains at least two agents, one of which must be positive literal.
Encoding Positive Value Rules by Rule Relations
Encoding a positive value rule into WPM formulas is straightforward. Let R = {r 1 , . . . , r n } be a set of positive value rules. For each rule r i , we introduce a new Boolean variable B i (i = 1, . . . , n). We define B as the set of all such Boolean variables, i.e., B = {B 1 , . . . , B n }. Intuitively, B i = 1 means r i is in a feasible set of rules.
In order to deal with the reachability mentioned in Theorem 1, we introduce a Boolean variable S i, j for each pair of rules r i and r j where 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n. Intuitively, S i, j = 1 means both r i and r j are reachable via "compatible on the same coalition" edges in the feasible rule set. To accomplish the reachability, we need the following hard clauses:
where 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n. The number of hard clauses for representing the transitive laws over R is n · (n − 1) · (n − 2) /2. 1. If r i and r j are "compatible on the same coalition", three hard clauses are generated:
If r i and r j are "compatible on different coalitions", one hard clause is generated:
If r i and r j are "incompatible", one hard clause is generated: ¬B i ∨ ¬B j . 4. If r i and r j are "independent", then no clause is generated.
In the following, we use Hard (R) to denote a set of hard clauses representing the transitive laws and those introduced by Definition 5.
Lemma 1:
Let R be a set of positive value rules, R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l } ⊆ R be a feasible rule set, and B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B l } be the corresponding Boolean variable set. Then, B ∪ Hard (R) is satisfiable.
Proof 1: First, we consider hard clauses introduced by Definition 5-1. If B i ∈ B and B j ∈ B , then we can make S i, j = 1 because r i ∈ R , r j ∈ R , and r i and r j are compatible on the same coalition. If B i B , then we can make S i, j = 0 because r i R . Similarly, if B j B , we can make S i, j = 0. Thus, hard clauses introduced by Definition 5-1 are satisfied.
Next, we consider hard clauses introduced by Definition 5-2. If B i B or if B j B , the truth value of S i, j is not limited, so we only consider the case of both B i ∈ B and B j ∈ B . In this case, we can make S i, j = 0 because r i and r j are not reachable according to Theorem 1-2.
Then, we consider hard clauses introduced by Definition 5-3. We assume it is possible to hold both B i ∈ B and B j ∈ B . According to Theorem 1-1, either r i R or r j R . This contradicts our assumption.
It is obvious that the transitive laws are satisfiable under the above assignment.
Lemma 2:
Let R be a set of positive value rules and B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . , B l } be a subset of B. If B ∪ Hard (R) is satisfiable, then {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l } is a feasible rule set.
Proof 2:
The proof is basically the reverse process of proving Lemma 1. Given B ∪ Hard (R) is satisfiable, the corresponding rule set R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r l } includes no pair of rules connected by the relation of "incompatible" because of Definition 5-3, and if any two rules in R are compatible on different coalitions, then they are not reachable via the relation of "compatible on the same coalition" according to Definition 5-2. Therefore, R is a feasible rule set.
The above two lemmas indicate that if R is a feasible rule set, then B ∪ Hard (R) is satisfiable, and vice versa. Thus, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3:
The encoding given by Definition 5 with the transitive laws leads a MaxSAT solver to output the correct results of the CSG problem, consisting of a set of positive value rules.
Encoding Positive Value Embedded Rules with Rule Relations
We reform the explicit form of er : I 0 |I 1 , . . . , I k → w er . For each I i (i ∈ {1, · · · , k}), we first investigate whether P 0 ∩ N i ∅ or P i ∩ N 0 ∅ holds. If at least one of the conditions holds, it means I 0 and I i cannot apply to the same coalition by nature, then nothing would be done. Otherwise, we add one agent in P i to N 0 , so that the coalition that I i applies to (suppose C) contains at least one agent in N 0 , which makes I 0 impossible to apply to C. This explicit form guarantees that I 0 and I i (i ∈ {1, · · · , k}) cannot apply to the same coalition. With this method, the number of agents to be added in er is largely decreased. For convenience, we assume in the rest of this paper, that each embedded rule is expressed in our reformed explicit form. er applies to some coalition in CS . Obviously, whether an embedded rule applies to some embedded coalition is uniquely determined by whether the set of its auxiliary rules is feasible. Thus the constraints on rule relations as well as the transitive laws for representing reachability could be specified on auxiliary rules only, instead of embedded rules.
Definition 6: (WPM encoding for positive value embedded rules). Let ER be a set of positive value embedded rules in the explicit form. For each positive value embedded rule er ∈ ER (i.e., er : I 0 |I 1 , . . . , I k → w er (w er > 0)), the following clauses are introduced:
• one weighted soft clause: (B er , w er ), and
The possible relations between any two auxiliary rules and the transitive laws among auxiliary rules are defined in the same way as introduced in Sect. 4.1.
Theorem 4:
The encoding given by Definition 6 leads a MaxSAT solver to output the correct results of the CSG problem, consisting of a set of positive value embedded rules.
Proof 3:
The encoding of rule relations with transitive laws has been elaborated in Sect. 4.1, we only need to prove the encoding of positive value embedded rule in Definition 6 is correct. • r 1 and r 2 , r 1 and r 6 , r 2 and r 5 are independent: no clause is generated.
To solve this problem, 16 variables and 47 clauses are generated. The generated clauses include 4 weighted soft clauses representing rules, 2 hard clauses generated by the embedded rule, 11 hard clauses capturing the constraints on rules, and 30 hard clauses representing the transitive laws. All the above clauses are connected into a CNF formula. The MaxSAT solver takes the CNF formula as an input, and outputs the optimized social welfare and the corresponding feasible rule set.
Encoding Negative Value Rules by Rule Relations
Encoding negative value rules into WPM formulas is not as straightforward as translating positive value rules. First, in WPM, the weight of a clause must be positive, and MaxSAT solvers can only solve problems with the weight larger than 0. Therefore, turning negative values into positive is indispensible. In addition, the constraints on a negative value rule and its dummy rules [15] should be encoded into propositional Boolean formulas that MaxSAT solver can deal with.
Definition 7:
(WPM encoding of negative value rules). Let R be a set of negative value rules. We introduce a weighted soft clause (¬B x , −w x ) for each negative value rule r x ∈ R (i.e., r x : I x → w x , w x < 0). It is clear from Definition 7 that for a negative value rule r x , each of its dummy rules r i x is always incompatible with r x . This is because r i x and r x always share the same positive literal a 1 , but meanwhile r i x either takes a positive literal of r x as its negative literal, or takes the negative literal of r x as its positive literal. Thus the negative value rule is selected only if none of its dummy rules are selected, as described in Theorem 2. The rigorous proof is shown in [15] .
Theorem 5:
The encoding given by Definition 5 and Definition 7 with transitive laws leads a MaxSAT solver to output the correct results of the CSG problem, consisting of a set of negative value rules.
Proof 4: Given a negative value rule r x , if r x is in a feasible rule set, i.e., B x = 1, the payoff generated by (¬B x , −w x ) and I x → w x is 0 and w x , respectively. If r x is not in a feasible rule set, i.e., B x = 0, the corresponding payoff of (¬B x , −w k ) and I x → w x is −w x and 0, respectively. Clearly, the payoff of (¬B x , −w x ) is constantly (−w x ) larger than that of I x → w x . Considering a coalition game of n negative value rules, the social welfare after encoding negative value rules is −W neg larger than the original one, where
Hard clauses introduced by Definition 7 (1) and (2) are encoded from Theorem 2. Now, we prove the encoding is correct. Let R be a feasible rule set and B be the corresponding Boolean variable set. Let D (r x ) = {r Under the above encoding, the CSG problem has been encoded into the one containing only positive value rules. The remaining work is the same as introduced in Definition 5. Detailed proof of this part is mentioned in Lemma 1, Lemma 2, and Theorem 3.
It must be noted that the construction of dummy rules guarantees that each negative value rule is incompatible with all of its dummy rules, and such "incompatible" relation has been captured by Definition 5. Therefore, in practice, hard clauses in Definition 7 (2) is redundant and can be omitted safely.
After the encoding of negative value rules and the constraints on dummy rules, the remaining work of solving the problem is the same as handling positive value rules introduced in the previous subsection, i.e., identifying the rule relations between each pair of rules and generating corresponding hard clauses on rule relations, as well as hard clauses from transitive laws. Note that when identifying rule relations and representing the transitivity of rule relations, newly generated dummy rules should be taken into account. More specifically, let R d be the set of dummy rules, then the various types of rule relations encoded in Definition 4 should be identified over R ∪ R d , and the number of hard clauses for representing the transitive laws should be extended to (n + n d ) (n + n d − 1) (n + n d − 2) /2, where n d is the cardinality of R d .
Encoding Negative Value Embedded Rules by Rule Relations
The WPM encoding of negative value embedded rules is similar to that introduced in Sect. 4.3, both derived from Theorem 2.
Definition 8: (WPM encoding for negative value embedded rules). Let ER be a set of negative value embedded rules in the explicit form. For each negative value embedded rule er ∈ ER (er : I 0 |I 1 , . . . , I k → w er , w er < 0), where
generates the following two types of dummy rules:
• r 
Theorem 6:
The encoding given by Definition 6 and Definition 8 leads a MaxSAT solver to output the correct results of the CSG problem, consisting of a set of negative value embedded rules.
Proof 5:
The correctness of Definition 6 has been proved in Theorem 4. In the following, we prove the encoding in Definition 8 is correct.
Given a negative value embedded rule er, if er does not apply to any embedded coalition in CS , i.e., B er = 0, the payoff generated by the soft clause (¬B er , −w er ) and the rule er is (−w er ) and 0, respectively. If er applies to some embedded coalition in CS , i.e., B er = 1, the payoff generated by (¬B er , −w er ) and er is 0 and w er , respectively. Clearly, in either case, the payoff of (¬B er , −w er ) is (−w er ) larger than that of er. Considering a coalition game of n negative value embedded rules, the social welfare after encoding is −W neg The remaining work is the same as handling positive value rules introduced in the previous subsection, i.e., identifying the rule relations between each pair of rules and generating corresponding hard clauses on rule relations, as well as hard clauses from transitive laws. To solve this problem, 29 variables and 143 clauses are generated. The generated clauses include 4 weighted soft clauses representing rules, 2 hard clauses generated by the negative value (embedded) rule, 32 hard clauses capturing the constraints on rules, and 105 hard clauses representing the transitive laws. The original social welfare is recovered by subtracting −W neg = 2 from the result output by the solver.
Evaluation
This section shows the experimental results of the rule relation-based WPM approach (RWPM). We follow the method of generating instances in direct encoding [15] , summarized as follows. First create a coalition with one random agent, then repeatedly add a new random agent with the probability of α until an agent is not added or the coalition includes all agents. Then, we repeatedly add a new condition of each rule with probability β until the condition is not added. The value of a rule is chosen between 0 and the number of agents in the rule, uniformly at random. In addition, for each coalition that contains more than one agent, we move an agent from positive to negative with the probability of p. Furthermore, we convert the value of a coalition from positive to negative with the probability of q. Throughout the experiment, we set α = 0.55, β = 0.15, p = 0.2, q = 0.2, and #rules = #agents, ranging from 10 to 120. For each fixed #rules, 100 problem instances are generated.
As mentioned before, RWPM encodes the CSG problem into propositional logic and need a MaxSAT solver to output the final solution. Therefore, choosing the right MaxSAT solver in our experiment is of great importance. So far, there are a variety of MaxSAT solvers for a wide range of practical applications. They can be classified into two categories. The one implements a branch and bound scheme, and the other one uses a stateof-the-art SAT solver as an inference engine, referred to as SAT-based solver. SAT-based solvers are further classified into two: satisfiability-based and unsatisfiabilitybased. The state-of-the-art solvers for weighted partial MaxSAT, which we used, are listed as follows: Sat4j (version 2.2.3) [21] and ShinMaxSat [22] are satisfiability-based solvers. WPM1 (version 2012) [23] and Pwbo (version 2.0) [24] are unsatisfiability-based solvers. Note that Pwbo is a parallel solver incorporating a satisfiability-based search into an unsatisfiability-based approach. Akmaxsat (version 1.1) [25] and WmaxSatz (version 2009) [26] are branch and bound solvers. To select an appropriate solver in our evaluation, we apply these MaxSAT solvers to solve instances generated from the CSG problem in PFGs and compare their performances, shown in Table 1 . For each instance and solver, there is a time limit of 900 seconds. Number in bracket means the number of instances that were successfully solved within the time limit by the corresponding solver and is omitted in the table if the solver managed to solve all the 100 instances. At some fixed #rules (suppose #rules = N), if a solver fails to solve any instances within the time limit, then we terminate the solver and mark "/" for the corresponding solver with #rules > N. The last two columns of Table 1 indicate the average size of instances for each #rules, i.e., the average number of Boolean variables and clauses generated for solving the problem instances. The tests were carried out a Core i5-2540 2.6GHz processor with 8GB RAM.
As can be seen from Table 1 , Sat4j, ShinMaxSat, and Pwbo managed to solve all the problem instances with #rules ranging from 10 to 120. By contrast, branch and bound-based solvers performed worst in our experiment, which could only solve a part of instances with #rules = 10. In addition, as #rules increases, the superiority of Sat4j becomes more conspicuous, and it can be inferred that Sat4j may be more desirable when #agents keeps growing. Therefore, we conclude that Sat4j is the appropriate solver in our experiment. Figure 1 depicts the average computation time for solving the generated problem instances by the direct encoding algorithm [15] and RWPM. RWPM was run on a Core i5-2540 2.6GHz processor with 8GB RAM and employed Sat4j as the MaxSAT solver. In comparison, direct encoding algorithm [15] was run on an Xeon E5540 2.53GHz processor with 24GB RAM and used ILOG CPLEX (version 11.2) as a general-purpose mixed integer programming package. From Fig. 1 , it is clear that RWPM dominates the direct encoding algorithm for large values of #rules. In particular, when #rules increases over 90, the average computation time of direct encoding goes up sharply and reaches around 125 seconds at #rules = 120. By contrast, the average computation time of RWPM grows much slowly and gets to merely 10 seconds to solve the problem instances with #rules = 120.
Conclusion
In this paper, we made the first step towards a study of applying MaxSAT solvers to the CSG problem for CFGs and PFGs, represented by MC-nets and embedded MC-nets, respectively. With encodings of rule relations, we evaluated several state-of-the-art MaxSAT solvers and demonstrated that Sat4j performed better in solving the CSG problem in PFGs than any other solver in our test. Experimental results showed that, compared with the previous algorithm that does not make use of MaxSAT solvers, the WPM encodings for rule relations succeeds in solving the same sets of problem instances within significantly less time.
